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Abstract—The exponential growth of the blockchain size has
become a major contributing factor that hinders the decentral-
isation of blockchain and its potential implementations in data-
heavy applications. In this paper, we propose segment blockchain,
an approach that segmentises blockchain and enables nodes to
only store a copy of one blockchain segment. We use PoW as a
membership threshold to limit the number of nodes taken by an
Adversary—the Adversary can only gain at most n/2 of nodes in
a network of n nodes when it has 50% of the calculation power
in the system (the Nakamoto blockchain security threshold). A
segment blockchain system fails when an Adversary stores all
copies of a segment, because the Adversary can then leave the
system, causing a permanent loss of the segment. We theoretically
prove that segment blockchain can sustain a (AD/n)m failure
probability when the Adversary has no more than AD number
of nodes and every segment is stored by m number of nodes.
The storage requirement is mostly shrunken compared to the
traditional design and therefore making the blockchain more
suitable for data-heavy applications.
Index Terms—Distributed processing, Edge computing, Con-
tent distribution networks, Distributed management, Blockchain,
Blockchain Storage
I. INTRODUCTION
In the anonymous and autonomous society like a blockchain
system, every record should be re-derivable. This feature
forms the essential trust of the blockchain, and secures the
blockchain; thus, keeping every history transaction is critical.
However, the size of the Nakamoto blockchain (Bitcoin [1])
has grown from the ground to over 226 Gbytes in the past
ten years from January 2009 to June 2019; the size doubled
since the February 2017 (at slightly over 100 Gbytes) [2]. If
the exponential growth to be continued, we are expecting 1.5
to 1.6 TBytes in Jan 2021, 3 to 3.2 TBytes in Jan 2022.
Parallel to the growth of blockchain size, the storage cost
of being a full node (the node which stores all the blocks
of the mainchain) in the Bitcoin network is also grown in
exponential.
It holds the promise that, through the usage of blockchain,
complex and data-demanding jobs can be distributed through
predefined protocols (usually through smart contracts [3]–
[5]) to the anonymous nodes throughout the network, and
the majority consensus can secure the job results. Ideally, an
alternative-finance system can be built upon—the job publisher
pays the system to do tasks, while the anonymous nodes in
the system get paid by generating the commonly recognised
task results [3]. It is guaranteed by the decentralisation and
anonymous nature of blockchain that as long as the security
threshold—the Adversary not having more than half of the
participated calculation power is sustained, the results recog-
nised by the majority are the correct results [1]. However, the
oversize problem increases the bar of storage requirement for
participants, making the system hard to process data-heavy
applications like training Artificial Intelligence video recog-
nition models [6], [7] distributedly and decentralisedly if the
system remains universally joinable. Ordinary devices simply
do not have enough space to store the data, and the system
becomes increasingly centralised if the system process those
applications. A transaction in Bitcoin and other Distributed
Ledgers [3], [8] sized only around several hundreds of bytes.
Even with such little usage of data, disadvantaged nodes are
gradually leaving the mining game of most Distributed Ledger
systems. More and more devices are acting in lightweight
mode [9], [10] or join in mining pools [11], [12] for the reason
of both lacking calculation advantage and the space for storing
the blockchain.
Many flavours of approaches like weighted models [9], [10],
[13], off-chain [14], [15], blockchain sharding [16]–[18] are
proposed in recent researches to improve the performance of
the blockchain. Many approaches attempt to ease the burden
of individual nodes and solve the dilemma among having the
ability to process everything, maintaining the decentralised
system and increasing the performance.
For weighted models, the winning chance in the mining
game and the duty of a node are different by weights.
The lightweight node system [9], [10] is an example of the
weighted model. A lightweight node does not store any block
but is the client of some full nodes. They require relevant
transactions from the full node to verify a new transaction
using Simple Payment Verification (SPV) inquires [19]. A
lightweight node only takes up to 4.2M Bytes per year,
regardless of the total size of blockchain [19], but it cannot
verify the new blocks and can be misled by full nodes. In
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [8], people elect a fixed
number of representatives and contribute their stakes to these
representatives; these representatives then compete in the game
of PoS [20]. DPoS has excellent performance because the
representative nodes usually have a superpower regarding
calculation ability, storage, and network bandwidth. These
models are now commonly used in many blockchain-powered
IoT systems [21], [22], where lightweight nodes are at the
edge, or the nodes contribute their stakes to DPoS to function
the system. Because the use of authoritarian/superior nodes,
the systems are potential-centralised and the system security
highly depends on these representatives.
For off-chain approaches, the relevant persons publish a co-
signed contract at the beginning and the end of the relationship.
Then they do the trading securely through off-chain channels
[23], [24] without publishing transactions to the blockchain.
They only publish the transactions to the blockchain when one
violates the off-chain transactions. They need to monitor the
blockchain to detect any violations; thus, it is not desirable for
users who may go offline. And, there are few usages of off-
chain approaches in non-financial related applications. Instead
of broadcasting the task and the task result to the network,
the entities who use off-chain methods must communicate in
private, and this also compromises the anonymous nature of
the blockchain.
For blockchain sharding approaches, they distribute nodes
into different shards and divide the storage as well as the jobs
to different shards which runs in parallel so that generally the
work demand for individual nodes are not increased with the
increase of transaction per second globally. Blockchain shard-
ing is designed for applications that require high concurrency
and high transaction per second. The design of blockchain
sharding approaches mainly focuses on lowering the chance
for the Adversary to occupy the majority spots in a shard when
the Adversary has taken a relatively large population of nodes
but has not taken the majority nodes globally. It is possible
for the Adversary not having a security threshold number of
nodes globally but controlled a shard, then the security of the
system as a whole is compromised. In order to maintain the
security of the system, there are very strict requirements over
the number of shards and the number of nodes inside a shard
[18].
We see some blockchain-based storage systems proposed
in recent years [25]–[33], for most cases, the blockchain is
only used as the ”contract-signing witness” between the data
publisher and the data keeper. Approaches so far are not trying
to reduce the size of the blockchain itself and thus cannot avoid
the storage pattern of Bitcoin. Not to mention, the nodes not
only need to store the transaction (the contract between the
data-publisher and the data-keeper), they also need to keep
some data published by the data-publishers.
In this paper, we show a new blockchain structure that
cut the blockchain into parts. We use blocks as the input
to update the states of the ledger. Once a block is accepted,
the transactions inside are executed, and then a new state is
derived basing on the old one. In Bitcoin case, a state is the
balance of every wallet address. A fixed number of blocks are
placed into a segment; a segment is stored by different nodes
and is retrieved by a user only when the user wants to re-
derive a state. The nodes keep the latest state so that they can
verify the new transactions. They also need to keep a segment
assigned by the system to participate in the mining game. In
this model, the Adversary may attempt to cause a permanent
loss of a specific blockchain segment by storing all the copies
of a blockchain segment and then disappear from the network
once succeed. The Adversary may also attempt to deceive the
system by claiming it stores a part of the blockchain which it
does not store.
Segment blockchain dynamically divides the blockchain
into h//s segments following the sequence of blockchain. It
requires nodes to show a PoW (Proof of Work) [34], [35] when
joining in the system as well as every time the nodes present
the evidence of storing to the system. In this way, we avoid the
Sybil attack [36] and make sure that the Adversary can only
take up to n/2 of nodes if it has 50% of the overall calculation
power. We use a hypothesis taken from our recent blockchain
sharding research [18] to label different nodes in Segment
blockchain. We categories the participated nodes into different
classes and ensures every part of the blockchain is stored by
one node per class. Nodes gain the reward for keeping the
blockchain segments in the edited game of mining.
Instead of using that hypothesis to build a blockchain
sharding system that is more focusing on the improvement
of transaction per second, Segment blockchain concentrates
solely on the reduce of blockchain size. In blockchain sharding
systems, the honest nodes must be the majority of every shard
to keep the security of the system as a whole. However,
considering storage, when an Adversary fails to become the
keeper of every copy of a Segment, its attack does not succeed.
So that, in segment blockchain, we do not require the honest
people to be the majority of the people who store a specific
segment, we only need to ensure that every segment gets at
least a reliable keeper. With the loose security threshold, we
can assign less number of nodes to store a segment in order to
keep that segment securely, compared to blockchain sharding
systems where they need to secure the majority nodes are
honest. That is why the storage can be much shrunken.
Segment blockchain is suitable for most blockchain ap-
plications nowadays including notation [37], identity con-
trol [38], multinational customs record exchange [39] which
applications do not require a large transaction throughput
(like ten thousand to 1 million per second), but get benefit
from decentralisation. It also helps the implementation of
blockchain in IoT environment where the edge devices are
lacking storage capacity to keep the full record; meanwhile,
the systems are not requiring significant transaction per second
[40]. Segment blockchain can even be used to improve the
blockchain sharding by separating transaction storage from
transaction verification: the nodes in shards only keep the latest
state in their shards, and the history transactions are placed
into Segments and being handled separately by Segment
blockchain.
In the following sections, we will show the Segment
blockchain in detail, discuss why our method is secured and
can provide a (AD/n)m failure probability; also, how the
model prevents the spoof of storing. We will also show the data
requirement compared to the traditional Nakamoto blockchain
(Bitcoin).
II. THE Jury HYPOTHESIS AND ITS USAGE IN SEGMENT
BLOCKCHAIN
We proposed the Jury Hypothesis as an analogy of an n/2
Byzantine-node tolerate blockchain sharding approach in [18],
which turns the blockchain into multiple committees that run
in parallel.
The Jury Hypothesis states that the member of the Jury
of a court comes from the diverse background, so that when
a verdict is reached, it can be seen as the decision reached
from the whole society (every class of people). If it takes m
different occupations to form a jury, then when there are a s
number of court hearings run in parallel, there are s number
of people in each one of the m occupation. Table I shows a
court schedule; each court represents a shard, A is a person
controlled by the Adversary while H is an honest person.
TABLE I: Court Schedule
Ocp
Court number
0 1 2 3
Occupation 1 A A A A
Occupation 2 H A H A
Occupation 3 A H A H
Occupation 4 H A H H
Occupation 5 H H H H
It is ruled that a verdict is reached when a pre-defined
T , T > 0.5m number of people inside the jury reached
a consensus. Assuming there exists a random assignment
scheme that assigns people of the same occupation to different
courtrooms where different court hearings are taken place in
parallel. Then, the chance for the Adversary to gain T spots
inside the target courtroom is (assuming the Adversary put all
its nodes into the front T occupations)
Pr[T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(1)
where Ai is the number of people inside courtroom i who are
controlled by the Adversary. To derive the maximised Pr[T ],
we want
∏T
i=1 Ai to be maximised because s is the same. Let
the Adversary has AD number of people inside the system
(Court Jury Schedule), then AD =
∑m
i=1 Ai. To maximise
the value of
∏T
i=1 Ai, we consider
Ai = ⌊AD/T ⌋, i ∈ [1, T − 1] (2)
AT = ⌊AD/T ⌋+AD mod T (3)
This scenario is the maximised because, given any positive
integer X ,
X ∗X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗X − 1 (4)
Thus,
Pr[T ]max ≈ (
AD
T ∗ s
)T (5)
A. The Jury Hypothesis for Segment blockchain
Let the jury of a court stores part of the blockchain, then
for the Adversary to control all the people (T = m) inside
this jury is
Pr[T ]max ≈ (
AD
m ∗ s
)m (6)
Let the court system has a n number of jury members in
total (n = m ∗ s). Then,
Pr[m]max ≈ (
AD
n
)m (7)
If the Adverary has no more than 50% fraction of the people
inside the system (Nakamoto blockchain threshold), then
Pr[T = m]max ≈ (
1
2
)m (8)
Thus, the maximum chance for a failure to occur is (12 )
m.
B. Challenge
The challenge of implementing Jury Hypothesis for the
blockchain storage is (1) how to give different nodes different
occupations. (2) how to randomly assign storage to a node.
(3) how to prove that a node stores a data. (4) how to adjust
the membership and reform the jury when nodes go offline.
III. SEGMENT BLOCKCHAIN
Segment blockchain cuts the blockchain into segments. The
size and the number of blockchain segments are dynamically
adjusted base on the quantity and the occupation of nodes in
the system. Every node only stores one blockchain segment
and the block header of every block in the mainchain.
A. Block as input
Let the blockchain be a state machine where every block
is the input of the current state; the machine reaches the
next state after processing the current block. In Segment
blockchain, every node keeps the latest state and all the block
headers while storing some copies of the previous blocks.
The blockchain is secured when a node can download all the
blocks, run them as inputs, and derive the same state. Figure
1 shows an example of this design.
In Bitcoin case, the state can be a ledger that records the
balance of every account.
State 0 Block 1
State 1 Block 2
State 2 Block 3
State 3
Self generable
Globally sync required
Fig. 1: An example of the block and state
B. blockchain segments
Let there be s number of blockchain segments; every
segment takes h//s number of nodes following the index
number of the blocks and a state derived from the latest
block of the previous segment. h is the current length of the
blockchain. Except the last segment, other segments are of
equal length. The last segment would additionally contain h
mod s blocks. Figure 2 shows an example of this design.
blockchain segment 1
blockchain segment 2
State 0 Block 1 Block 2
State 2 Block 3 Block 4
blockchain segment 1
blockchain segment 2
State 0 Block 1
State 1 Block 2
State 2 Block 3 Block 4
blockchain segment 3
h = 4, s = 2. h = 4, s = 3.
Fig. 2: The example of the blockchain segments
C. Node Membership
Let every block has a section which records the pending
nodes. The pending nodes are nodes which reported to the
system but has not yet been assigned with storage. When a
node wants to join in the system, it checks the pending nodes
information of the latest block and finds an occupation that
is less affluence in number. It then claims that occupation.
Let there be a threshold PoW difficulty P . The node needs to
present a PoW of a P × s difficulty to the system before this
node’s info (the occupation and a public identity key) is written
into the pending node section. Table II shows the structure of
this PoW. Until the node has been instructed to store a specific
blockchain segment, the node needs to additionally present a
P difficulty PoW (of the same content) in every iteration of
the mining game to the system to keep the spot in the pending
node section.
Rank the nodes’ info by the time their info is written into the
pending section in ascending order into a list PN . Let PNi,j
TABLE II: PoW for pending node
Name Storage Description
Hash Prev block 32 bytes The hash of the
block in block height
h-s.
Occupation 4 bytes The occupation claimed
Identity Key 32 bytes Node’s public identity key
Nonce 32 bytes The number tried for this PoW
to reach the required difficulty
refers to the index j pending node of the occupation i. Every
time when min(len(PNi)) >= 10, i ∈ [1,m], the storage
of all nodes is re-assigned while the size of the blockchain
segment is readjusted and 10 more blockchain segments are
created (s = s+10) and PNi,1..10, i ∈ [1,m] are added to the
system. Table III and IV shows an example of the nodes in
the system and the PN list; Table V and VI show a possible
situation of the nodes in the system and the PN list when the
front 10 elements of every occupation in the PN list (Table
IV) are added to the system. Because there is a queue for the
pending nodes in every occupation, it is nature for the nodes
to claim an occupation that is less affluence in number to join
in the system quicker. In this way, we solve the challenge (1)
of segment blockchain.
TABLE III: Nodes in the system
Occupation
blockchain segment
1 2 3 4
Occupation 1 A A A A
Occupation 2 H A H A
Occupation 3 A H A H
Occupation 4 H A H H
Occupation 5 H H H H
TABLE IV: PN list
PN
Occupation 1 A A H H A A H H H H H
Occupation 2 H A A A H H A A A H H
Occupation 3 A H H A A A H H A A
Occupation 4 H A A H H A H A A H H
Occupation 5 H H A H A A H H A H H
TABLE V: Nodes in the system after adding
Ocp
Bs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Occupation 1 H A H H A H A H A A A A A H
Occupation 2 H A H A A A H H A A H A H A
Occupation 3 H A A H H A A A H A H A A H
Occupation 4 A A H A H H A H H H A H H A
Occupation 5 H A H H H H H H H H H A A A
D. Storage assignment
When new nodes are added to the system right after block
height h, let IDi,j refers to the identity key of the node of
occupation i which stores j blockchain segment. Create a
RIDi,j = IDi,j hash BHh (9)
TABLE VI: PN list after adding
PN
Occupation 1 H
Occupation 2 H
Occupation 3
Occupation 4 H
Occupation 5 H
Transaction Merkle Root
Hash
BH4
Transaction4
BH3
Transaction3
Hash
BH2
Transacction2
BH1
Transaction1
Fig. 3: The example of a transaction Merkle tree of block i.
Let len(i) = 4, CIi = 3. The Merkle branch for Proof of
Storage contains all the nodes in red.
link RIDi,j with IDi,j and rank RIDi, i ∈ [1,m] by the
ascending order, then adjust IDi according to the sequence
of the ranked RIDi. BHi is the hash of the block i, hash
is a hash function that returns an 256 bits integer. After the
procedure above, the assignment is completed. In this way, we
solved the challenge (2) of segment blockchain.
E. Proof of Storage
Let every block header records the Merkle root of the
transactions embedded in the block. Let BHh be the block
header hash of the latest block height (block height h). If the
node j in occupation i stored the blockchain segment k, then
let
CIk = (BHh hash IDi,j hash i) mod len(k) + 1 (10)
where CIk is the index number of a transaction in blockchain
segment k, len(k) is a function that returns the number of
transactions inside the blockchain segment k. When the nodes
present the evidence of storing the blockchain segment k at
the block height h (referred to as Proof of Storage), it should
provide
• The transaction which CIk refers to.
• AMerkle branch that can derive the Merkle root indicated
in the block header of a block B in the blockchain
segment k.
• The transaction which CIk refers to is inside block B.
Figure 3 shows an example of the Proof of Storage. In this
way, we solved the challenge (3) of segment blockchain.
F. Mining and blockchain segment size adjustment
Segment blockchain runs the same mining rule as Nakamoto
blockchain for the block creation. Nakamoto blockchain rules
that the node which presents a valid block with the most
difficult PoW in an iteration wins that iteration of the mining
game.
Block i Block i+ 1 Block i+ 2
S
W
S
W
S
W
PoW and PoS sent by the nodes who are required to store blockchain segment k
The nodes who sent PoS and PoW are rewarded in Block i+ 2
S
W
S
W
S
W
Fig. 4: A mining procedure example. There are three occu-
pations (red, yellow, green); S rectangle represents Proof of
Storage; W rectangle represents a PoW
Let there be s number of blockchain segments existing in
the system, and the current block height is h. Then, the nodes
who were assigned to store the number k = (h mod s) + 1
blockchain segment should send the Proof of Storage to the
network after the block of the block height h is created. They
need to submit a PoW of P × s difficulty alongside the Proof
of Storage. Table VII shows the structure of PoW for these
nodes.
TABLE VII: PoW for nodes who are required to store
blockchain segment k
Name Storage Description
Hash Prev block 32 bytes The hash of the
block in block height h-s
Identity Key 32 bytes Node’s public identity key
Nonce 32 bytes The number tried for this PoW
to reach the required difficulty
The information of the nodes which stored blockchain seg-
ment k and presented Proof of Storage and PoW is embedded
in the block of the second next block height. Figure 4 shows
an example of this procedure.
When a node which stores the blockchain segment k,
k = (h mod s) + 1 does not present the Proof of Storage
and the fulfilled PoW at the block height h, the membership
of this node is eliminated after the block height h + 2. If
this node is of occupation X , and there is a pending node in
PNX , then PNX,1 replaces the eliminated node. If there is
no pending node in PNX , then s = s − 1, the number of
blocks in every blockchain segment is adjusted accordingly.
After that, all nodes storing the blockchain segment k before
the adjustment are back to the pending node section. In this
way, we solve the challenge (4) of segment blockchain.
G. Storage adjustment delay
When h//s is changed, the components of every segment is
changed. Because of that, nodes need to adjust the segments
they store by adding or deleting blocks, and sometimes it also
needs to derive a new state from the old one. For example, in
Figure 2, when s changed from 2 to 3, blockchain segment two
would contain ”State 1” instead of ”State 2”. The nodes store
segment two would need to derive the State 1 by acquiring
segment one and execute blocks since ”State 0”. It is required
that the nodes need to keep the old version of their segments
for one block iteration after h//s is changed to avoid conflicts
between different versions of segments. In this way, it is
providing time for nodes to change the segments smoothly.
H. Reward
There are two parts of reward in segment blockchain, one
for creating a block, one for keeping the blockchain segments.
The reward for creating the block is given using the same
rule as Nakamoto blockchain (the reward starts from a large
amount of currency at first, and cut in half in every fixed
time window until reaching zero). The reward for keeping the
blockchain segments is given using the following rules:
• When a node showed the Proof of Storage and the
fulfilled PoW in the block height h, the reward is given
to this node at the block of the block height h+2 (using
the node’s public identity key as the wallet address).
• The reward is equally divided to every node.
• The amount of the reward for every iteration comes from
the system (as like the Nakamoto blockchain). After the
reward from the system goes to zero, the reward then
comes from the transaction fees.
I. Power constrain
As every node which stores the data are required to present
P ×s amount of difficulty per s block height, the node should
at least be able to generate a P difficulty PoW per iteration.
We say the node which can generate P difficulty PoW in
one iteration has P power. Let s = 1, and there is n × P
amount of power globally. The Adversary who has (n/2)×P
amount of power can only keep n/2 of nodes in a system
of n nodes because it needs to place P amount of power for
every Adversary node. If s > 1, every node still needs place
P amount of power to maintain the spot in the system in every
iteration. Otherwise, the Adversary node will be expelled at
the next time window (the time window is sized s) for not
being able to provide a P × s difficulty PoW. If an Adversary
who has P amount of power stop placing power for its node A
and tries to gain a new node B, A and B cannot remain in the
system at the same time. This is because B also needs P×s of
power in order to become a pending node. Thus, regardless of
the number of s, for an Adversary who has (n/2)×P amount
of power, it can only keep n/2 of the nodes.
IV. COMBINING n/2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING WITH
SEGMENT BLOCKCHAIN
For blockchain sharding approaches, nodes only store trans-
actions in their shards, so that the storage globally is also
divided. However, since blockchain sharding approaches aim
to process the transactions in different shards in parallel to
improve the transaction per second globally, the system is
requiring the honest nodes to be the majority of every shard.
As a result, the number of shards that the transactions as a
whole can be divided into, in blockchain sharding approaches,
is much smaller than the number of Segments that the trans-
actions can be divided into in Segment blockchain.
For an n/2 blockchain sharding system which uses Segment
blockchain, the nodes keep the latest state in their shards and
store different segment of the blockchain (the segments may or
may not be one that contains blocks within the nodes’ shards).
We need to consider two failure probabilities in this system:
the chance for the Adversary to control a shard and the chance
for the Adversary to take all the copies of a segment. Since
the two attacks are unrelated, the maximum failure probability
Prmax for a blockchain sharding system in overall is
Prmax = max(Prshardmax , P rstoragemax) (11)
We know that
Prshardmax = (
AD
T × S
)T (12)
and
PrStorage
max
=
1
2
m
(13)
Let
Prmax >= [(
AD
T ∗ s1
)T ≈
1
2
(n/s0)
] (14)
where 0.5 ∗ n/s1 < T <= n/s1, T is a pre-defined setting
1
We can use equation 14 to calculate the maximum number
of shards s1 required for the n/2 blockchain sharding approach
to function securely and the maximum number of segments s0
the Segment blockchain embedded to the system can have in
order to maintain the same security threshold Prmax.
Let AD = n2 (this is the maximum AD, because if exceed
this number the Adversary would be the majority). Then, we
can derive:
s0 = −
n× log(2)
log(2−T × ( ns1×T )
T )
(15)
Assumed we set the maximum failure probability to be
Prmax = 10
−6 (this bounds the number of s1), then we derive
S0
S1
which is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: s0/s1
1The smaller the T is, the less secure a shard is, the larger the T is, the
easier a shard can be halted by the Adversary [18].
As the data in Figure 5 suggested, the blockchain can be
divided into S0S1 more times of segments than shards, so that the
nodes can store a much smaller number of blocks than store
all the blocks of a shard. Thus, if a blockchain sharding system
separates the transaction storage from transaction verification
by embedding a segment blockchain, the storage requirement
for an individual node can be reduced significantly.
V. DATA REQUIREMENT
Let a record in State sized 41 bytes (a wallet address sized
33 bytes, the balance of a wallet address sized 8 bytes). Let a
block of the Nakamoto blockchain sized SB bytes, a block of
segment blockchain sized SB + SizePending node section. A
record in Pending node section sized 68bytes (4 bytes for
the occupation of this node, 32 bytes for the public identity
key and 32 bytes for the PoW it demonstrated). In reality, we
can use persistent data structure [41] to store States. In this
way, the size of storage can be further reduced.
Figure 6 shows the data requirement for the segment
blockchain with different number of records in the State (let
SB = 1Mbytes,m = 256), and with the changes of the block
height h. Let there be 8000 nodes (the number of the Bitcoin
nodes currently), 256 pending nodes are in the pending node
section in every block. Figure 7 shows the differences in the
amount of data stored in a node in the Nakamoto blockchain
and the amount of data stored by a node in segment blockchain
with the different number of accounts in the state. Segment
blockchain largely shrank the data required while maintaining
the full functions of Nakamoto blockchain.
Fig. 6: Segment blockchain data requirement
As the analysis in Section 2 showed, the chance for the
Adversary who has 50% of the overall calculation power to
store all the copies of a block is 12
m
. When m = 256, the
security of segment blockchain reached the security level of
the standard public-private encryption systems. It is very safe
to use an m = 256 segment blockchain to power financial
systems because the encryption systems of the same security
threshold are already widely tested by the public and used in
many online banking systems.
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Fig. 7: Segment blockchain data requirement compared to
Nakamoto blockchain data requirement
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed an approach to reduce the stor-
age requirement of the blockchain system while keeping the
decentralisation without compromising the security of the
blockchain. The data analyses proved that segment blockchain
largely reduced the data requirement compared to Nakamoto
blockchain. Thus, it is of more advantage to using segment
blockchain to power data-heavy blockchains.
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